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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenarios played out in a law office some
where in Texas:
Scenario No. 1
A woman walks into a lawyer's office without an appointment. She
is very upset, and she needs to speak to an attorney right away. After
speaking with her for a few minutes, the attorney discovers that the
woman's husband died last week. The woman is visibly grief-stricken
over the death of her loved one, but the attorney is curious as to why
this is an emergency. There appears to be more at issue than the sim
ple probate of a will. (Of course, the attorney later finds out there is
no will.) Finally, the woman reveals that, piled onto her grief, she has
been informed that her marriage has been a sham-that her husband's
first marriage did not end in divorce as she thought it did (and as her
"husband" told her it did ). The first wife appeared shortly after the
funeral, and she wants what is rightfully hers as the lawful wife. What
are the attorney's options?

t The author received both his Bachelor of Science and his Doctor of Jurispru
dence degrees from the University of Texas at Austin in 1996 and 1999, respectively.
He is currently employed at the Law Offices of Joan Dell Dolce in Kerrville, Texas,
where he practices estate planning and probate law. The author would like to thank
Professor Stanley Johanson for his guidance; his wife, Nicki, for her support and edit
ing skills; and the judge who did not believe this doctrine existed for his inspiration.
1
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Scenario No. 2
A woman calls to speak to an attorney. It is evident from her tone
of voice that she is very angry. She wants a divorce from her husband.
She makes an appointme�t with the attorney and comes in later in the
week. The attorney files the divorce petition as she has done many
times before. Two weeks later, the answer is faxed to the attorney
with an intriguing affirmative defense: no marriage existed between
the woman and the man because the man was never legally divorced
from his first wife. What does the attorney do?
The attorneys involved in these scenarios would likely have a sense
that there is something very inequitable about their clients' prospects
under Texas law. However, both of the attorneys will find an equita
ble doctrine hidden in the case law: the doctrine of putative spouses.
This paper will introduce the putative spouse doctrine as it existed
in Texas from the very first case in 1846, 1 discuss the doctrine as it
presently stands, and clarify the doctrine's application in future cases.2
Part II of this article introduces the doctrine and discusses its histori
cal development. Part III addresses the current doctrine and its appli
cation to various situations, such as divorce and probate. Part IV
compares Texas's treatment of putative spouses with the treatment ac
corded such spouses in the other community property states. Part V
concludes and suggests expansion and codification of the doctrine.
II.

HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE IN TEXAS

Spanish and Mexican law governed in Texas until the adoption of
the English common law in 1840,3 and Spanish law, and specifically
Las Siete Partidas,4 made a significant legal impact on Texas. As Mar
ian Boner states in her Texas legal history reference guide:
The first true Spanish code, Las Siete Partidas, was compiled late
in the thirteenth century but was not promulgated until 1348.
Nearly two hundred years later, in 1530, its authority was extended
to the New World by its incorporation into the Recopilaci6n de las
Leyes de Indias. Later compilations superseded but did not repeal
1. Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621 (1846).
2. This paper does not discuss whether the putative spouse doctrine should be a
part of Texas law. The author believes that the doctrine is a vital part of Texas case
law and leaves public policy arguments for another forum.
3. Act approved Jan. 20, 1840, 4th Cong., R.S., 1840 Repub. Tex. Laws, reprinted
in 2 H .P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAws OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 177 (Austin, Gammel Book
Co. 1898). As we shall see later, the Act excepted from its coverage "all land grants,
mineral rights, and marital-property concepts. In these areas and in the system of
courts and pleadings, the civil law prevailed." MARIAN BONER, A REFERENCE
GUIDE TO TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY 9 (1976).
4. LAS Srnrn PARTIDAS (1348) (Spain), translated in LA s SIETE PARTIDAS (Sa
muel Parsons Scott trans., CCH 1931).
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the Partidas, and its provisions were considered to be still in force in
Texas until the reception of the common law by the Act of 1840. 5
No provision of Las Siete Partidasspecifically addresses the putative
spouse doctrine. The doctrine was inferred from Partida IV, Title
VIII, Law I which concerned the legitimacy of children:
If between those who are married openly in the face of the church,
such an impediment should exist that the marriage must be annulled
on account of it, the children begotten before it was known that an
impediment of this kind existed will be legitimate. This will also be
the case where both the parties did not know that such an impediment existed, as well as where only one of them knew it, for the
ignorance of one alone renders the children legitimate. But, if after
it had been certainly ascertained that such an impediment existed
between the parties, they should have children, all those born subsequently will not be legitimate.6
This provision was cited in Smith v. Smith7 when the Texas Supreme

Court first discussed the putative spouse doctrine. John W. Smith
married Harriet Stone in Missouri.8 Several years later, in 1830, he
married Maria de Jesusa Smith in San Antonio.9 When Mr. Smith
died, Samuel Smith, an alleged son of Mr. Smith by Harriet Stone,
petitioned for letters of administration for Mr. Smith's estate.' ° Samuel Smith claimed that Maria was not the "surviving wife" of Mr.
Smith under the probate statutes in effect at the time of Mr. Smith's
succession, and therefore the letters should be granted to Samuel as
the "next of kin."' 1
The court first addressed the issue of whether the evidence establishing the first marriage was legally sufficient.' The court concluded
that it was not, but stated that, even if the evidence had been legally
sufficient, Samuel would not have been entitled to the
administration. 3
The court reached this conclusion by addressing the issue whether,
assuming the existence of the first marriage, Maria was nevertheless
entitled to all of the rights and privileges of a surviving spouse.' 4 The
court concluded that Spanish jurisprudence would govern the rights
and obligations of a marriage "contracted before the introduction of
5.
6.

BONER, supra note 3, at 1 (footnote
LAS SIETE PARTIDAS Partida IV, tit.

omitted).
XIII, law I, translatedin

LAS SIETE PAR-

948.
7. 1 Tex. 621 (1846).
8. Id. at 621.
9. Id. at 625-26.
10. See id. at 622.
11. Id. at 623-24 (citing Act approved Feb. 5, 1840, 4th Cong., R.S., § 1, 1840
Repub. Tex. Laws 110, 110-11, reprinted in 2 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS
1822-1897, at 284, 284-85 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898)).
12. Id. at 624.
13. See id. at 626.
14. Id. at 624.
TIDAS
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the common law." 15 The court then cited Las Siete Partidas16 as authority for the putative spouse doctrine.1 7 Citing Partida IV, Title
XIII, Law I regarding legitimate children, the court stated:
This law, in its terms extends only to the legitimation of children
whose parents, or one of them, have the misfortune through ignorance, to contract marriage during the existence of an impediment
which would annul such provision; but the spirit of the provision
would extend the same protection to the innocent parent, as to the
innocent offspring ....

The legitimation of the children, should be

considered as only one of the effects of the innocence of the parents, and not as precluding the parent herself, whose
claim is
18
equally as strong, from all benefit on the same grounds.
The court found support for extending the law's protection of children to cover spouses in El Diccionario de Legislacion. 9 This work,
according to the court, defined a putative marriage as:
[A] marriage, which being null on account of some dissolving impediment, is held, notwithstanding, for a true marriage, because of
its having been contracted in good faith, by both or one of the
spouses being ignorant of the impediment. Good faith is always
presumed, and he who would impede its effects, must prove that it
did not exist. To make the good faith perfect, it is necessary that the
marriage should have been celebrated with the prescribed solemnities-that the spouses may have been ignorant
of the annulling vice,
°
and that their ignorance be excusable./
The court stated that the end of a putative marriage produces the
same effects as the end of a lawful marriage, but the effects will only
benefit a spouse who acted in good faith."' The court also recognized

15. Id. at 626-27.
16. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS Partida IV, tit. XIII, law I (1348) (Spain), translated in
LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 948 (Samuel Parsons Scott trans., CCH 1931).
17. Smith, 1 Tex. at 627.
18. Id.

19. Id. at 628. The publication cited by the court is probably an earlier version of
JOAQUIN ESCRICHE ET AL., DICCIONARIO RAZONADO DE LEGISLACION Y JURISPRUDENCIA [THE WELL-GROUNDED DICTIONARY OF LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE] (Madrid, J.M. Biec y Dronda 1874-76) [hereinafter DICCIONARIO DE

LEGISLACION]. This book was first published in 1831. M. Diane Barber, The Legal
Dilemma of Groundwater Under the Integrated Environmental Plan for the MexicanUnited States Border Area, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639, 658 n.89 (1993). It contains language exactly parallel to language the court attributes to the source with the exception that the book contains citations. Compare 3 DICCIONARIO DE LEGISLACION 49,
with Smith, 1 Tex. at 629 (1846). However, the first edition of the book did not contain citations. 1 DICCIONARIO DE LEGISLACION at vii (discussing the absence of citations in the first edition of the book).
20. Smith, 1 Tex. at 628-29 (emphasis in original) (apparently translating 3 DICCIONARIO DE LEGISLACION

49).

21. Id. at 629.
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that a putative marriage may be converted into a lawful marriage once
the impediment is removed.22
Turning to the facts of the case, the court concluded that Maria was
the decedent's lawful wife under the law in place at the time of marriage (Spanish law).2 3 Therefore, the court held that she should be
allowed to administer her deceased husband's estate. 24 Her right
rested on the facts that the marriage had lasted fifteen years and that
Maria was the mother of the decedent's children, which meant that
'
Maria had "a larger interest in the property than any other person. 25
The Texas Supreme Court did not have a problem applying the putative spouse doctrine in cases involving pre-1840 marriages because
Spanish law applied. 26 However, marriages contracted post-1840 were
another matter. In 1882, the supreme court was asked to decide
whether the putative spouse doctrine still existed.2 Although the
court left open the question of what a person in the putative spouse's
position would receive, it did imply that the common law of England
as adopted in 1840 governed the marriage contract. 28 Therefore,
Spanish law and the Texas cases citing to Spanish law could not be
invoked.29
This case left the Court of Civil Appeals with no guidance as to the
status of the putative marriage doctrine. Subsequent cases demonstrate this lack of guidance. In Morgan v. Morgan,30 a court of civil
appeals held, without referring to the doctrine, that a woman who in
good faith marries a man she believes to have been divorced is entitled to a share of the property acquired by their joint efforts, notwithstanding the nullity of the previous divorce.31 However, three years
later, in Chapman v. Chapman,32 the court held that the second wife
could not be appointed administratrix and had no rights to the husband's property since the second marriage was a nullity.33 In Lawson
v. Lawson,34 the court held that property acquired in a putative mar22. Id.
23. See id. at 633.
24. Id. at 633-34.

25. Id. at 634. Interestingly, this case came up on appeal ten years later in Lee v.
Smith, 15 Tex. 142 (1856). In that case, the issue was whether the children of the first
marriage were considered to be heirs. The court concluded that they were heirs, their
status as such being fixed at the time of death. Id. at 144-45.
26. See Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 732, 742 (1858). In Carroll, a case decided
twelve years after Smith, the court relied on the same premises used in Smith to validate another pre-1840 putative marriage. See id.
27. Routh v. Routh, 57 Tex. 589, 593 (1882) (appellee's argument).
28. See id. at 596, 600-01.
29. Id. at 595.
30. 1 Tex. Civ. App. 315, 21 S.W. 154 (1892, no writ).
31. See id. at 320, 21 S.W. at 156.
32. 11 Tex. Civ. App. 392, 32 S.W. 564, writ ref'd, 88 Tex. 641, 32 S.W. 871 (1895).
33. See id. at 396, 32 S.W. at 565.
34. 30 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 69 S.W. 246 (1902, writ denied).
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riage (although the court did not call it such) should be treated as
property acquired in a partnership.3 5
In 1905, the Texas Supreme Court answered the question originally
propounded in Routh. In Barkley v. Dumke,3 6 the court expressly
held that the common law as it existed in 1840 did not apply to the
consequences of a void marriage.3 7 The court cited the act itself,
which expressly provided that the common law did not apply to the
property rights of husband and wife.38 The court held that a "putative
wife, so long as she acts innocently, has, as to the property acquired
during that time, the rights of a lawful wife."39 This holding firmly
secured the putative spouse doctrine in the case law of Texas. Since
then, no Texas court has questioned the doctrine's usefulness. However, Texas courts have misconstrued and misapplied the doctrine, and
recent appellate decisions reflect this confusion.
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT DOCTRINE

A.

The Doctrine Generally

A marriage which is contracted during an already existing marriage
is void ab initio.4 0 However, courts presume that all marriages are
valid, and there must be strong proof before they will hold to the contrary.4 1 To rebut the presumption it is not necessary to "prove the
nonexistence of divorce in every jurisdiction where proceedings could
have been possible; it is only necessary to rule out those proceedings
where [the husband] might reasonably have been expected to have
pursued them."4 2
Once the presumption is rebutted the second marriage becomes
void, and the second spouse must resort to having her marriage declared a "putative marriage., 43 The courts define a putative marriage
as "one that is invalid by reason of an existing impediment on the part
of one or both spouses; but which was entered into in good faith by
35. Id. at 48, 69 S.W. at 248.
36. 99 Tex. 150, 87 S.W. 1147 (1905).
37. Id. at 153, 87 S.W. at 1148.
38. Id. at 152, 87 S.W. at 1147 (citing Act approved Jan. 25, 1840, 4th Cong., R.S.,
§ 4, 1840 Repub. Tex. Laws 3, reprinted in 2 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS
1822-1897, at 177, 178 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898)).
39. Id. at 153, 87 S.W. at 1148 (emphasis added).
40. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.202(a) (Vernon 1998).
41. See id. § 1.101; Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1975) (holding that
where there is a second marriage there is a presumption that the first marriage was
dissolved).
42. Davis, 521 S.W.2d at 605; see also Caruso v. Lucius, 448 S.W.2d 711, 715 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. See Garduno v. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1988, no writ).
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the parties, or one of them, good faith being essential."" The putative
marriage may be ceremonial or common law in origin.45
Once a litigant has proven a ceremonial or common law marriage,
the litigant must then prove good faith.46 The best summary of the
47
proof needed for this requirement comes from Garduno v. Garduno:
The good faith of the putative spouse is generally a fact question.
When the spouse is unaware of a prior undissolved marriage, good
faith is presumed. However, when the putative spouse is aware that
a former marriage existed at one time, the question becomes one of
the reasonableness of that party's belief that the former marriage
has been dissolved. A putative spouse may believe in good faith
that a prior marriage has been48dissolved by divorce, even though in
the eyes of the law it has not.

The Garduno court went on to analyze Louisiana case law, which
holds that once a spouse becomes aware of a possible impediment
through reliable means, she has a duty to investigate further and cannot simply bury her proverbial head in the sand.4 9
B.

Putative Spouse Entitlement

If a party can prove the requirements for a putative marriage, the
court then must decide what the putative spouse is entitled to. Unfortunately, the case law on this has become muddled in recent years,
due in large part to reliance on previously discarded cases. Additionally, the entitlement often depends on what assets the putative spouse

is seeking.
1. General Discussion
Two lines of authority deal with putative spouse entitlement. The
first line begins with the Morgan v. Morgan5" and Barkley v. Dumke5 1
44. Dean v. Goldwire, 480 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
45. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d at 738. For many years, however, this was not the case.
Under the original Spanish doctrine a ceremony was required. Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex.
621, 628-29 (1846). This ceremonial requirement remained even through the 1940s.
See Papoutsis v. Trevino, 167 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942,
writ dism'd). In 1950, an appellate court held that no ceremony was required. See
Hupp v. Hupp, 235 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The Houston Court of Civil Appeals followed suit in 1964, basing its decision in part
on a Court of Criminal Appeals ruling on the doctrine in the context of child support.
Whaley v. Peat, 377 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(citing Curtin v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 625, 635, 238 S.W.2d 187, 192 (1950)). See also
Rey v. Rey, 487 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, no writ) (following
the holdings in Whaley and Curtin).

46. See Dean, 480 S.W.2d at 496.
47. 760 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
48. Id. at 740 (citations omitted).
49. Id.

50. 1 Tex. Civ. App. 315, 21 S.W. 154 (1892, no writ).
51. 99 Tex. 150, 87 S.W. 1147 (1905).
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cases discussed above,5" and ends with Padon v. Padon.5 3 The second
line begins with the Chapman v. Chapman54 and Lawson v. Lawson 55
cases discussed above,56 and ends with Garduno. Only one of these
lines is correct.
The first line of cases holds that a putative spouse, "so long as she
acts innocently, has, as to the property acquired during [the time of
marriage], the rights of a lawful wife."' 57 This statement was adopted
by the commission of appeals (and the supreme court by approval) in
Lee v. Lee,5" again by the supreme court in Davis v. Davis, 59 and finally by the San Antonio Court of Appeals in Padon.6 °
The second line of cases holds that property acquired during a putative marriage is not community property, but jointly owned separate
property.6 1 The authority for this proposition is Little v. Nicholson,62

a Galveston Court of Civil Appeals case that cited Chapman as its
authority. 63 Garduno, the most recently published decision on putative marriages, has adopted this view.64

After reviewing each line of authority, the first line of cases appears
to be the more correct and authoritative statement of the law. First,

with respect to its accuracy, the Barkley line of cases has more fully
adopted the Spanish law doctrine, which provides that the putative
wife "shall enjoy the civil rights of a legitimate wife."' 65 Second, the
first line of authority includes two supreme court cases that adopted
the holding in Barkley.66 In contrast, the second case line is based

entirely on courts of appeals decisions.67

52. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
53. 670 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
54. 11 Tex. Civ. App. 392, 32 S.W. 564, writ refd, 88 Tex. 641, 32 S.W. 871 (1895).
55. 30 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 69 S.W. 246 (1902, writ ref'd).
56. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
57. Barkley v. Dumke, 99 Tex. 150, 153, 87 S.W. 1147, 1148 (1905).
58. 112 Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828 (1923).
59. 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975).
60. Padon v. Padon, 670 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
61. Mathews v. Mathews, 292 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956,
no writ).
62. 187 S.W. 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1916, no writ).
63. Id. at 507-08. See also Lawson v. Lawson, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 46, 69 S.W.
246, 247 (1902, writ ref'd) (holding that the marriage should be treated as a
partnership).
64. See Garduno v. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1988, no writ).
65. Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621, 629 (1846) (translating 3 DICCIONARIO DE LEGISLACION 49).
66. See Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 398, 247 S.W. 828, 830 (1923); Davis v. Davis, 521
S.W.2d 603, 606 (Tex. 1975) (adopting the Barkley rule through Lee).
67. See Garduno,760 S.W.2d at 739 (citing Mathews v. Mathews, 292 S.W.2d 662,
665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, no writ)); Lawson, 30 Tex. Civ. App. at 48-49,
69 S.W. at 248; Chapman v. Chapman, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 392, 396, 32 S.W. 564, 565,
writ refd, 88 Tex. 641, 32 S.W. 871 (1895).
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Third, the first line of cases provides a more equitable division of
the assets. For example, in the divorce context, the first line of cases
would give the putative spouse community rights. The property
would thus be subject to a "just and right" division.6" The second line,
by holding that the property is jointly owned separate property, would
exempt all property acquired during the putative marriage from division by the court.6 9 It would require a partition of all of the property,
real and personal.7 0
Finally, and most importantly, the second line of authority is based
on case law that has been overruled. Garduno's holding that the
Spanish law doctrine of putative marriage no longer existed in Texas
after the adoption of the common law was based on Chapman.7
However, Barkley overruled Chapman by implication.72 In Barkley,
the Texas Supreme Court held that the common law did not apply to
cases involving marital rights, and thus
the Spanish law doctrine re73
mained entrenched in Texas case law.
The unfortunate result is that Garduno is now cited for the proposition that property acquired during a putative marriage is jointly
owned separate property.7 4 Of course in all other aspects of putative
marriages, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals was correct, and the
court also further defined the doctrine. Clearly, however, the court's
holding regarding putative spouse entitlement is tenuous and contradicts the holdings of the supreme court. The next time a case involving the rights of a putative spouse gets to the appellate courts, the
issue should be re-examined and the case law set straight. In the interim, the following discussion will assume that the first line of authority is correct.
2.

Divorce

On divorce, the putative wife is "entitled to share equally in the
community property" because the laws regarding property acquired in
a lawful marriage apply to that acquired by the parties to a putative
68. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon 1998).
69. See Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1982) (holding that the
court cannot divide the separate property of divorcing spouses).
70. See Little v. Nicholson, 187 S.W. 506, 508 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1916, no
writ).
71. See Garduno, 760 S.W.2d at 739 (citing Mathews, 292 S.W.2d at 665 (citing
Chapman, 11 Tex. Civ. App. at 395, 32 S.W. at 565)).
72. See Barkley v. Dumke, 99 Tex. 150, 153, 87 S.W. 1147, 1148 (1905).
73. See id. at 152-53, 87 S.W. at 1147-48 (overruling Chapman by implication).
74. See In re Estate of Hite, No. 09-98-349CV, 1999 WL 278898, at *3 (Tex.

App.-Beaumont May 6, 1999, no pet.) (per curiam) (not designated for publication).
A later case, In re Marriage of Sanger, No. 06-99-00039-CV, 1999 WL 742607 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana Sept. 24, 1999) (not designated for publication), quotes Garduno,
but goes further to misquote Davis by saying that a putative spouse's rights are only
"analogous" to a lawful spouse's rights. Id. at *3.
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marriage. 75 Interestingly, even if the putative spouse subsequently becomes aware of the impediment, erasing the good faith requirement,
she is still entitled to one-half of the property acquired during the time
she acted in good faith. 76 This was illustrated by Osuna v. Quintana,77
in which the putative wife received nothing because all the property
had been acquired after her78good faith was destroyed and the relationship became meretricious.
Finally, one Court of Civil Appeals has held that a putative wife is
not a necessary and indispensable party to a divorce action between
her husband and his lawful wife.7 9

3. Heirship and Decedents' Estates
The most common situation involving putative marriages arises in
probate court after the husband has died, when the first wife appears
to claim her part of the husband's estate. This is usually the first time
the putative wife discovers that the husband's first marriage never
ended.
The husband can bequeath his separate property to the putative
wife in his will and also name her as executrix,8 ° so the problem only
arises when the husband is disposing of his share of the community
property or when the husband dies intestate.
The community property issue is associated with the first and lawful
wife. Under the Texas Probate Code, the putative spouse retains her
interest in any community property,8 ' while the husband disposes of
his share by will.82 However, the husband may only dispose of onehalf of his interest because the first wife retains a one-half interest in
the husband's one-half.83 Presumably, the result will be that the putative wife receives a three-fourths interest in the community property
of the putative marriage, assuming she is the beneficiary of the hus75. Dean v. Goldwire, 480 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
76. See id.
77. 993 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no writ).
78. See id. at 210. In a meretricious relationship, each party owns "property acquired in proportion to the value of his (or her) labor contributed to the acquisition of
it." Dean, 480 S.W.2d at 496 (quoting Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308, 116 S.W.
43 (1909)) (internal quotations omitted).
79. See Roberson v. Roberson, 420 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.

§ 37 (Vernon 1980).

81. See id. § 45 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
82. See Garduno v. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d 735, 741 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1988, no writ).
83. See Caruso v. Lucius, 448 S.W.2d 711, 712 n.1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that the putative spouse is entitled to a one-half interest in
all property acquired during the putative marriage, with the remaining one-half split
equally between the husband and the lawful wife).
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band's will. The first wife will hold a one-fourth interest in such
property.
The issue becomes more complicated when the husband dies intestate. Initially, only the lawful wife was entitled to a share of the husband's estate. This was the holding in Chapman v. Chapman,8' and
this view was expressed by the Beaumont Court of Appeals in an unreported case from 1999.85 However, this is an incorrect statement of
the law. Under Texas law, the surviving spouse at least retains her
interest in any community property and gains a one-third interest in
any separate property of the decedent.86 While the separate property
provision refers to "husband or wife,"' and the community property
provision refers to "spouses," 88 neither of the statutes expressly excludes putative spouses. Thus, a putative spouse would presumably
have the same rights as the lawful spouse.
This is especially true in light of the two supreme court cases that
addressed this issue. In Lee v. Lee,89 the dispute was whether the putative wife had any interest in a death benefit that the husband's employer was to pay.9" The husband had not designated a beneficiary
under the employer's plan.9 The benefits were therefore "payable
'according to the laws of Texas applicable to the estates of deceased
persons." 92 The court held that the putative wife "possessed all the
rights and privileges of a lawful wife." 93 It concluded that the putative

wife was entitled "to a one-half interest in all community property
acquired during the existence of the putative marriage," and thus she
was entitled to one-half of the death benefits.94 The other half was
apparently given to the husband's lawful wife.95

This issue was also raised in Davis v. Davis.96 Davis involved the
division of wages owed by a deceased husband's employer and the
proceeds from an insurance policy provided by the employer.97 In this
case, the court held that the putative spouse was entitled to a one-half
84. 11 Tex. Civ. App. 392, 395-96, 32 S.W. 564, 565, writ refd, 88 Tex. 641, 32 S.W.
871 (1895).
85. See In re Estate of Hite, No. 09-98-349CV, 1999 WL 278898, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont May 6, 1999, no pet.) (per curiam) (not designated for publication).
86. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38(b) (Vernon 1980), § 45 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
87. Id. § 38(b) (Vernon 1980).
88. Id. § 45 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
89. 112 Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828 (1923).
90. Id. at 396, 247 S.W. at 829.
91. Id. at 399, 247 S.W. at 830-31.
92. Id., 247 S.W. at 831 (quoting the disputed insurance policy).
93. Id. at 398, 247 S.W. at 830.
94. Id. at 398-99, 247 S.W. at 830, 833.
95. See id.

96. 521 S.W.2d 603, 604-05 (Tex. 1975).
97. Id. at 606-07.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

11

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 7 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 3

TEXAS WESLEYAN'LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

interest in each.9" Also, the lawful wife was entitled to the remaining
one-half.99

These cases illustrate that the putative wife is, at a minimum, entitled to a one-half interest in any community property.100 Unfortunately, no case has been decided which involved separate property,
but the outcome should be analogous to that for community property,
with the lawful wife and putative wife evenly splitting the one-third
interest to which a surviving spouse is entitled and receiving one-sixth
each (assuming the property is personal and there are no children). 10 1
Texas courts have discussed one final issue: the right of the putative
spouse to be appointed administrator of the decedent's estate. 10 2 In
Chapman, the court of appeals held that only the lawful wife was entitled to such appointment. 10 3 This view was also adopted in Walker,
where the court further held that only the lawful wife was entitled to
the homestead and allowances from the decedent's estate. 10 4 However, the Texas statute governing appointment of administrators does
not specifically exclude a putative spouse.10 5 The supreme court decisions in Lee and Davis, which gave a putative spouse all the rights of
the lawful spouse, have probably overruled the views expressed on
this issue in Chapman and Walker.
4. Insurance
As with decedents' estates, a husband can name the putative spouse
the beneficiary of any proceeds from life insurance or other death
benefits. 0 6 However, if the insurance policy is community property,
the same issues dealt with regarding decedents' estates arise. The first
and lawful wife could argue that one-fourth of the policy proceeds
belong to her.0 7 To prevail on this argument, however, the first wife
would have to prove "fraud on the community," an equitable doctrine
based upon constructive fraud.'08
98. Id.
99. See id. at 605.
100. See also supra note 83.
101. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38 (Vernon 1980).
102. See Walker v. Walker's Estate, 136 S.W. 1145, 1148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, writ
ref'd); Chapman v. Chapman, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 392, 395-96, 32 S.W. 564, 565, writ
refd, 88 Tex. 641, 32 S.W. 871 (1895).
103. Chapman, 11 Tex. Civ. App. at 395-96, 32 S.W. at 565.
104. Walker, 136 S.W. at 1148.
105. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 77 (Vernon 1980). The surviving spouse is second-in-line to serve, behind only the executor appointed in the decedent's will. See id.
106. Mendez v. Mendez, 277 S.W. 1055, 1056 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgm't
adopted).
107. See Caruso v. Lucius, 448 S.W.2d 711, 712 n.1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
108. In re Estate of Herring, 970 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998,

no pet.) (quoting Zieba v. Martin, 928 S.W.2d 782, 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1996, no writ)) (internal quotations omitted).
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Whether the putative spouse can take out a policy on her husband is
another question. In Mendez v. Mendez, a0 9 the commission of appeals
held that a de facto wife is entitled to the proceeds of a life insurance
policy if she is named the beneficiary." 0 The court also held that, in
the absence of a named beneficiary, the lawful wife is entitled to the
proceeds."' As the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals stated, "a putative wife' 2has [an] insurable interest in the life of her asserted
husband." "
5.

Worker's Compensation

Worker's compensation is one other area in which the issue of putative marriages has arisen. While this area is related to the problems
with insurance, there are significant distinctions between the two beworker's compensation statute defines an "eligible
cause the.
1 13
spouse."

An "eligible spouse" is "the surviving spouse of a deceased employee unless the spouse abandoned the employee for longer than the
year immediately preceding the death without good cause, as determined by the commission."" 'a While the word "spouse" is not defined
within this definition, it has been defined by the courts.
In 1940, the Austin Court of Civil Appeals held that the word
"wife" in the worker's compensation statute meant "lawful wife," and,
therefore, a putative wife was not entitled to any benefits. 1 15 This
view was subsequently adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in Texas
Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Grimes.116 The'court also held that a putative
wife could not recover for the wrongful death of her husband." 7
The current statute contains nothing to obviously change this
rule. 8 Thus, it seems that a putative spouse has no entitlement to
any benefits under the worker's compensation statute. Indeed, the
court of appeals in Woods even stated that a putative spouse cannot
challenge the abandonment with good cause portion of the definition
because of the lack of an interest. 19
109. 277 S.W. 1055 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgm't adopted).
110. Id. at 1056.
111. Id.
112. Renchie v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 174 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1943, no writ) (citing Mendez, 277 S.W. at 1057).
113. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.182(f)(3) (Vernon 1996).
114. Id.
115. Woods v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 141 S.W.2d 972, 978 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1940, writ ref'd).
116. 153 Tex. 357, 361, 269 S.W. 332, 335 (1954) (citing Woods, 141 S.W.2d at
978-79).
117. Id.
118. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.182 (Vernon 1996).
119. Woods, 141 S.W.2d at 978.
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Conclusion

While the putative spouse may not have an interest in worker's
compensation benefits, she has an interest in the rest of the husband's
estate. For this reason, the definition of "eligible spouse" in the
worker's compensation statute should be amended to include putative
spouses. Additionally, an appellate court must resolve the major issues involved in putative spouse entitlement, or trial courts will continue to follow Garduno v. Garduno.120 These issues should be
addressed by the legislature or challenged on the next appeal, and the
legislature or appellate court should take them seriously.
IV.

OTHER COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES

121

Texas, being only one of several states with Spanish heritage, is not
the only community property state to recognize the putative spouse
22
doctrine. The doctrine has also been fully adopted in California 1
and possibly in Nevada.' 23 Additionally, Louisiana has adopted the
doctrine as it existed in the Napoleonic Code, 124 and the Supreme
Court of Washington recently invoked the doctrine's terminology for
an old Washington remedy which is closely parallel. 25 Other community property states have adopted some part of the doctrine or similar
principles in the interest of fairness. 1 26
A.

Californiaand Nevada

Unlike Texas, California has codified some of the aspects of the putative spouse doctrine, especially with respect to divorce.127 Under its
scheme, a court will divide the property "which would have been community property or quasi-community property if the union had not
been void or voidable. ' 128 California calls this property "quasi-mari120. 760 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
121. Much of the discussion in this part was made significantly easier by using
Christopher L. Blakesley's broad overview of the putative spouse doctrine as a
reference guide. See generally Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage
Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1985). Also, this part does not address the doctrine as
applied in non-community property states because, as Mr. Blakesley points out in his
article, these states "cannot adopt the pure or classic civilian putative spouse
doctrine," although a few common law jurisdictions have tried. See id. at 37-38.

122.

CAL. FAM. CODE

§ 2251 (West 1994).

123. See W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1228 n.3 (Nev. 1992)
(Springer, J., dissenting). The majority did not address putative spouses under Nevada law. See id. at 1223-25.
124. Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. 797, 804 (La. 1935).
125. Himes v. Maclntyre-Himes (In re Marriage of Himes), 965 P.2d 1087, 1100
(Wash. 1998) (en banc).
126. See IDAHO CODE § 5-311(1), (2)(c) (Michie 1990); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.255
(West Supp. 1999).
127. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2251, 2254 (West 1994).

128. Id. § 2251(a)(2).
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tal property. ' 129 To qualify as a putative spouse, one must have the
requisite good faith belief in the validity of the marriage. 130 Like
Texas courts, California courts apply the putative spouse doctrine
where an otherwise valid marriage is made invalid by an undissolved
prior marriage or similar impediment.13 ' However, they also apply it
when an attempt to create a marriage does not meet the requirements
of California law, as for instance when the ceremony is not witnessed. 3 2 In such cases, a spouse who would claim the protection of
the doctrine must have believed reasonably and in good faith that the
attempt was sufficient.133 The court may, in addition to the division of
property, order payment of support to the putative spouse. 3
California has also provided by statute that a putative spouse who
was dependent on the decedent has standing to assert a wrongful
death action.135 Along with these statutes, California courts have held
that (1) a putative spouse is a "surviving spouse" for purposes of inheriting separate property, 36 (2) a putative spouse is entitled to appointment as administrator of the estate and has preference over
anyone else,'1 37 and (3) a putative spouse is not entitled to receive a
family allowance under the California Probate Code. 138 Finally, although California does not recognize common law marriages, 139 solemnization of the putative marriage is not necessary for imputation of
good faith; it is, however, a major factor in the consideration of good
140
faith.
While one judge has suggested that the putative spouse doctrine
may exist in Nevada as a result of the Spanish legal heritage it shares
with California, the only Nevada judge to address the subject suggested its breadth was sharply limited by differences between the statutes of the two states.' 4 1 No appellate court has ever construed the
doctrine. If called upon to do so, the Nevada courts would probably
129. Id.

130. Id. § 2251(a).
131. See Vryonis v. Vryonis (In re Marriage of Vryonis), 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 811
(Ct. App. 1988).

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See id. at 813.
Id.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2254 (West 1994).
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West

Supp. 2000).
Smith v. Garvin (In re Estate of Leslie), 689 P.2d 133, 142 (Cal. 1984).
See id.

138. See Hafner v. Hafner (In re Estate of Hafner), 229 Cal. Rptr. 676, 691 (Ct.
App. 1986).
139. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 306 (West 1994).
140. Vryonis v. Vryonis (In re Marriage of Vryonis), 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 813 (Ct.

App. 1988). California does not recognize common law marriages. See
CODE § 306 (West 1994).

CAL. FAM.

141. See W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1228 n.3 (Nev. 1992)
(Springer, J., dissenting). Nevada also recognizes common law marriages. See Dahlquist v. Nevada Indus. Comm'n, 206 P. 197, 199 (Nev. 1922).
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defer to the California courts for guidance on42the issue, aside from any
differences caused by the Nevada statutes.1
B.

Louisiana

Louisiana is the only other state to codify the putative spouse doctrine. 143 In keeping with Louisiana's French civil law tradition, the
statute on putative spouses is based on literal translations of the Code
Napoleon. 4 4 The applicable statute states:
An absolutely null marriage nevertheless produces civil effects in
favor of a party who contracted it in good faith for as long as that
party remains in good faith.
When the cause of the nullity is one party's prior undissolved
marriage, the civil effects continue in favor of the other party, regardless of whether the latter remains in good faith, until the marriage is ?ronounced null or the latter party contracts a valid
marriage.
The emphasized language highlights the crucial difference between
Texas and Louisiana law-that the putative marriage is not over when
good faith ceases to exist. This was not always the law in Louisiana.
In a comment to the 1987 revision, the legislature stated that it intended to abrogate the traditional Louisiana rule only in the situation
where one party entered the marriage unaware of the impediment.
The reason for the change is that the good faith party has no power to
rectify the problem.' 4 6
Those matters which have been held to be civil effects under this
statute include the following:
[(1)] the legitimacy of the children[; (2)] the right of the putative
wife to claim workmen's compensation from her husband's employer[; (3)] the right of the putative wife to her proportionate share
of the community property[; (4)] the right of the putative wife to
inherit as a wife in the succession of the husband[; (5)] the right of
the putative wife to be considered as the "widow" under her husband's insurance policy[; and (6)] the right of the putative wife to
the marital portion, when she is otherwise qualified.' 4 7
Finally, there is authority that a ceremony is not required in order
for the marriage to qualify under the statute, and that, as in California,
if a couple does not comply with the requirements for a valid marriage
ceremony, a spouse who believed in good faith that they did comply
142. See Kelly v. Kelly, 468 P.2d 359, 363-64 (Nev. 1970) (stating that Nevada
adopted Spanish community property law as it existed in California at the time of
California's secession from Mexico).
143. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 96 (West 1999).
144. See Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. 797, 804 (La. 1935).
145. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 96 (West 1999) (emphasis added).
146. Id. cmt. b.
147. Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d 611, 613 (La. 1973) (citations omitted).
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can invoke the protection of the doctrine. 148 However, other authority holds to the contrary149 and the Louisiana legislature has explicitly
left this question open for the courts to decide.' 50
C. Washington
The Supreme Court of Washington has always protected the innocent spouse in a marriage that proves to be void. 5 ' However, recently
the court used the term "putative spouse" when referring to an innocent party and held that such a spouse "has equitable interests in the
common property acquired during an illegal marriage." ' Though
the court did not specify what this amount would be, it cited earlier
Washington cases which awarded innocent spouses one-half. 53 The
common property, however, is not community property and "belongs
' 54
to the one in whose name the legal title to the property stands.'
Unfortunately, while the Washington Supreme Court has recently
adopted the putative spouse terminology, it is unclear whether Washington will fully adopt the doctrine in the future.
D. Other States
A number of other states follow part of the putative spouse doctrine
or similar rules. These states, with the exception of Idaho, have not
expressly adopted the putative spouse doctrine but have used similar
equitable principles to achieve a just result. All of these states reject
common law marriage.' 55
The New Mexico Supreme Court has not dealt specifically with the
putative spouse doctrine, but the court has indicated that it might apply equitable principles in some similar situations to allow for payment of services rendered.' 56 In addition, an earlier decision held that
a wife who in good faith disputes an action based on the invalidity of
148. See Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. at 805 (upholding putative marriage when
one party believed in good faith a ceremony was not required).
149. See Succession of Cusimano, 138 So. 95, 96 (La. 1931) (holding that only a
"marriage actually contracted, though null" can give rise to a putative marriage).
150. See generally LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 96 cmt. e (West 1999) (expressly leaving this issue for the courts).
151. See Poole v. Schrichte, 236 P.2d 1044, 1049-51 (Wash. 1951); Creasman v.
Boyle, 196 P.2d 835, 838 (Wash. 1948).
152. Himes v. Maclntyre-Himes (In re Marriage of Himes), 965 P.2d 1087, 1100
(Wash. 1998) (en banc).
153. See id. (citing Brenchley v. Brenchley (In re Brenchley's Estate), 164 P. 913,
915 (Wash. 1917)).
154. Creasman,196 P.2d at 838 (citing Engstrom v. Peterson, 182 P. 623, 625 (Wash.
1919), and Hynes v. Hynes, 184 P.2d 68, 74 (Wash. 1947)).
155. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-111(B) (1999); IDAHO CODE § 32-201(1) (Michie 1996);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 765.05 (West Supp. 2000); Fellin v. Estate of Lamb (In re Estate of
Lamb), 655 P.2d 1001, 1002 (N.M. 1982). However, some states have grandfathered
marriages existing prior to the passage of this legislation. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25111(C) (1999); IDAHO CODE § 32-201(2) (Michie 1996).
156. See Lamb, 655 P.2d at 1004.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

17

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 7 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 3

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

the marriage may be entitled to alimony pendente lite.' 57 While it is
not clear how the court would rule on an assertion of putative marriage, the chances of such an assertion winning are probably slim.158
Putative marriages are not now recognized in Arizona, but at one
time they may have been. In 1953 the Arizona Supreme Court noted
the strong precedents in some states for the putative spouse doctrine,
although it did not use that term. 159 However, the court did not apply
those principles to the case at bar.160 Ten years later, the court held
161
that where there is no valid marriage no property rights will attach.
Based on these cases, it appears that Arizona courts will not recognize
the putative spouse doctrine if presented with such a claim.
The Idaho legislature has carved out one niche for the putative
spouse. A putative spouse is entitled to maintain an action for wrongful death. 6 This is because the putative spouse is an "heir."'1 63 A
putative spouse is defined by the statute as one who believed in good
faith the marriage was valid.' 64 No Idaho decision
has ever applied
65
the putative spouse doctrine in other contexts.
With its adoption of the Uniform Marital Property Act, Wisconsin
became a statutory community property state.' 66 Of course, without
the Spanish tradition that other community property states possess,
and with its statutory scheme, Wisconsin is an anomaly in the community property realm. Thus, it would seem that no elements of the putative spouse doctrine would survive, and yet one has.
In Wisconsin, if two persons enter into a marriage contract while
either of them has a husband or wife living, the marriage is void, 6 7
157. Prince v. Freeman, 112 P.2d 821, 823 (N.M. 1941).
158. Cf Hazelwood v. Hazelwood, 556 P.2d 345, 347 (N.M. 1976) (rejecting the.
idea of a "de facto marriage").
159. See Stevens v. Anderson, 256 P.2d 712, 714 (Ariz. 1953).
160. See id. at 714-15.
161. Cross v. Cross, 381 P.2d 573, 575 (Ariz. 1963) (en banc) (citing Mortenson v.
Mortenson (In re Estate of Mortenson), 316 P.2d 1106 (Ariz. 1957); Stevens, 256 P.2d
at 712). The court did, however, apply principles of equity and allow the "partner" to
recover for monies paid to improve the man's real property. See id. (citing Garza v.
Fernandez, 248 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1952)).

162. IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (Michie 1997).
163. Id. § 5-311(2)(c).
164. See id. § 5-311(2) (Michie 1990).
165. One case, Reichert v. Sunshine Mining Co. (In re Death of Reichert), 516 P.2d
704, 706 (Idaho 1973), held that there could be no common law marriage between a
man and a woman where the man's prior marriage was undissolved. However, this
case was decided before the wrongful death statute was enacted in 1984, see Act of
April 2, 1984, 47th Leg., 2d R.S., ch. 158, § 3, 1984 Idaho Sess. Laws 385, 385-86
(codified as IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (Michie 1990)), and the issue may be decided differ-

ently the next time around.
166. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 766.001 (West 1993).
167. See id. §§ 765.03, 765.21. One case has held that the marriage is not void, but
voidable at the court's discretion. Smith v. Smith, 190 N.W.2d 174, 176-77 (Wis.

1971). Contra Sinai Samaritan Med. Ctr. v. McCabe, 541 N.W.2d 190, 192 n.3 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that such a marriage is "void").
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and suit may be brought to annul the marriage at any time. 168 The
property upon annulment is divided in the same manner as with a
divorce or legal separation. 169 The interesting part of the statutory
scheme comes when the parties enter into a void marriage, but the
impediment to the marriage is later removed. In that case, if at least
one of the parties entered into the marriage in good faith, and the
good faith continues until removal of the impediment, the marriage
becomes legal upon the removal of the impediment. 170 Thus, even
this statutory community property scheme has incorporated some aspects of the putative spouse doctrine.
V.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of putative spouses has always been present in Texas
jurisprudence and is now completely ingrained upon our notions of
equity and justice in marriage. For this reason, it is unfortunate that
the doctrine has not been properly applied by certain courts of appeals. The best way to remedy this problem is to codify what has been
articulated herein as the correct line of authority on the issue of putative spouse entitlement, especially in the context of divorce and decedents' estates, and to amend already existing codifications such as the
worker's compensation statute to include putative spouses.
Additionally, the legislature should adopt a broad statute like that
of Louisiana. However, if the legislature does codify this doctrine, it
should go beyond the statutes of California and Louisiana to make the
doctrine uniformly applicable to all situations, and to leave little room
for interpretation.
Given that the putative spouse situation is encountered so infrequently, it is unlikely such a codification will occur. For that reason,
the next case that involves these issues should address them completely, perhaps laying the predicate for the Texas Supreme Court to
set the record straight.
168. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.03(4) (West 1993).
169. See id. § 767.255 (providing a single scheme for the division of property in
"annulment, divorce or legal separation").
170. See id. § 765.24; Smith, 190 N.W.2d at 176.
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